Azərbaycan Haqqında Xarici və Yerli Mediadan Götürülmüsh Məlumat Yığımı

"For us Nagorno-Karabakh is the number-one problem. It is obvious, that our economic might and our political weight will someday allow us to liberate our lands." – Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, interviewed January 30, 2007 for Le Figaro

"While we live in this world, Nagorno-Karabakh shall never become a part of Azerbaijan." - Gamlet Grigoryan, the Rector of the Karabakh University, in an interview appearing February 10, 2006 in La Liberation

 

 

Azerbaijan is currently experiencing an enviable economic rise due to the presence of natural resources, most importantly hydrocarbons, and because of its favorable location as an alternative to the Russian route for transporting Caspian oil. Though it cannot claim the same kind of burgeoning, oil-driven development, neighboring Armenia has also seen solid economic growth over the last few years. Both countries also maintain great geo-strategic importance as a “land bridge” between Europe and the Middle East, and consequently advocates in the United States and other Western countries stress the importance of promoting development in the region. However, growth and stability in Azerbaijan and Armenia have been hampered by a longstanding dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, one of the Caucasus’s most intractable political stalemates.

The way Azeris speak about Nagorno-Karabakh is reminiscent of how Serbs talk of Kosovo. In the 20th century, the indigenous population became a minority as Armenians migrated into the province. After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union led to a resurgence of nationalism in the region, violent campaigns evolved into ethnic cleansings and Armenia took control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjoining regions. As a result, over 900,000 ethnic Azeris became refugees or were displaced from their homes in or near Nagorno-Karabakh, while 300,000 ethnic Armenians fled from Azerbaijan.

Armenians call the Nagorno-Karabakh region “Artsakh,” the historic name of the province in ancient Great Armenia. For Armenians, it was wrong that Soviet authorities allocated lands populated primarily by Armenians—-particularly Nagorno-Karabakh-—to Azerbaijan. As a result of the war in the early 1990s, Nagorno-Karabakh and the mountainous corridor separating Karabakh from Armenia were completely “cleansed of” (or, in the Armenian view, “liberated from”) Azeris.

Thus far no peace treaty exists, as all attempts of the major world powers to mediate a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute have failed. Currently, Nagorno-Karabakh calls itself an independent state, even though it has not been recognized as such by any country in the world—-even by Armenia, which maintains close relations with Nagorno-Karabakh and sends recruits to serve in the Karabakh army. The 1994 armistice has largely held, although minor clashes along the ceasefire line have occurred regularly and have become more frequent in recent years, raising fears of a return to full-scale war.

On July 19, 2007, the ethnic Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh further heightened the tension by holding a presidential election to replace incumbent Arkady Ghukasyan. Though the election appeared to be relatively clean and competitive, it was not officially recognized by the international community. The Chair of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers declared that “conducting such ‘elections,’ thus preempting the outcome of the ongoing negotiations, cannot contribute to the resolution of the [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict.” The election met with considerable indignation from the Azeri capital of Baku; an Agence-France Presse article this July quoted the government officially declaring that “The separatist regime in the occupied Azerbaijani territory represents nothing but the illegal structure established by Armenia on the basis of ethnic cleansing of the Azerbaijani population.” For his part, current Armenian President Robert Kocharian, himself a former president of Nagorno-Karabakh, characterized the election to Regnum News Agency as “excellent.”

The historical attribution of this region is a subject rife with fierce disputes between Armenians and Azeris, as both parties put forth historical and ethno-cultural claims to the territory. The quotes at the top of this article are characteristic of statements heard from politicians and common citizens on both sides, and which create a steadfast impression of political deadlock and unwillingness to compromise. Such rhetoric implies growing concerns about a return to open hostilities are no idle talk.

Assessing the military capabilities of each side is beyond the scope of this article, but there appears to be no clear consensus about which side would win an armed conflict. In Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, it is noted with anxiety that Azerbaijan’s national government in Baku is planning to allocate $900 million for defense needs. This is only slightly less than the entire national budget of Armenia. However, despite increased expenditures, some, like The Economist, feel the Azeri army is still too weak to wage a full-scale war. Despite the defense budget imbalance, Armenians are only slightly less likely than Azeris to say they have confidence in their country’s military; 75% of Armenians do so, versus 82% of Azeris.

A further examination of Gallup poll data from both countries produces insights on factors that may affect on the situation—both in terms of each side’s willingness to go to war, and the possible outcomes of such a conflict. A successful military campaign requires more than strong economic conditions and a strong military, though both are critical. More fundamentally, it calls for sacrifice from a country’s people—which in turn requires that they have confidence in their national government, that they be engaged in the lives of their communities, and that they believe in the future of the country. The fortitude to wage war effectively relies to a great extent on what is in people’s hearts.

Certainly Ghukasyan, the former president of Nagorno-Karabakh, believes his people, the ethnic Armenians living in the region, have an advantage over Azeris in this regard. “It would be absurd to compare our human resources with those of Azerbaijan,” he said to Regnum News Agency in an article from 2006. “Azerbaijan has many advantages, but it had the same advantages at the beginning of the war [in the early 1990s] and you all know how that ended. Our advantage is the professionalism of our soldiers and our moral-psychological state. Why could the all-mighty China never bring Taiwan to its knees? Why can Cuba resist the USA?”

But can Armenians more generally claim a distinct “moral-psychological” advantage over Azeris? This survey data suggest not—in fact, the opposite is more likely to be the case.

 

Strength of Solidarity

 

Armenians and Azerbaijanis were asked how they would describe the loyalty they felt toward their country. Among all CIS countries, Azeris and Tajikistanis appeared the most resolutely loyal—about two-thirds of each population selected the following response: “My loyalty is unshakable—it’s my country whether it is on the right development path or not.” Among Armenians, just 42% selected this response.

 

Similarly, when the two populations were asked how strongly they identified with their country—a critical consideration in an ethno-national conflict—the percentage responding “strongly” or “very strongly” was much higher in Azerbaijan (75%) than in Armenia (48%). If a military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh does break out, national solidarity among both populations is likely to rise sharply. But Azeris appear likely to start from a point of greater solidarity than Armenians.

Religious identity is deeply ingrained in this part of the Caucasus, often heightening ethnic or national conflicts. As in many of the world’s most intractable disputes over territory—including Kosovo, Kashmir, Gaza and the West Bank—the most salient differences between the two sides are inexorably tied to religion. Armenia declared Christianity as its state religion in 301 AD, and it has historically struggled to maintain its Christian tradition in the face of conquering Muslim armies. Today, Armenia is still almost entirely Christian, surrounded by Muslim cultures in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran.

 

However, the poll results indicate organized religion may not currently be a significantly greater source of solidarity among Armenians than among Azeris. Asked “How strongly do you identify with your religion?” 43% of Armenians and 35% Azerbaijanis said “very strongly.” Nevertheless, Armenians are more likely than any other former Soviet republic to say they lack confidence in religious institutions—40% do so, which in this highly religious culture suggests that distrust in the Armenian Church is surprisingly widespread. In Azerbaijan, the comparable figure is just 17%.

 

Armenians’ relative lack of confidence also extends to their government. Respondents in both countries were asked to evaluate how well the national government is performing. In Azerbaijan, 42% said they felt their national government was doing an “excellent” or “good” job; just 17% of Armenians said the same about their own government. The implication is that the Azeri government would have an easier time garnering support for tough decisions than its counterpart in Armenia.

Perceptions of government efforts to combat poverty also differ significantly between the two countries. In response to the question, “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with efforts to deal with the poor?” 82% of Armenians said “dissatisfied,” which is considerably higher than the 59% in Azerbaijan. The important conclusion is that the Armenian government is failing to generate perceptions of solidarity with its people by providing supportive policies for its increasingly indigent population during tough economic times.

 

Finally, the idea that Azeris may have a very real advantage over Armenians in terms of solidarity is also reflected in residents’ determination to remain in the country. Respondents in the two countries were asked whether they would move permanently to another country if they had the means to do so. About three-fourths of Azerbaijanis (74%) said they would stay in Azerbaijan; only 55% of Armenians said they would remain in Armenia.

 

Confidence in the Future

 

Azeris’ greater willingness to give their government the benefit of the doubt is surely due in part to their more positive perceptions of the country’s economic performance. Experts say that completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeikhan oil pipeline will provide Azerbaijan with more than $20 billion in oil revenue over the next 20 years. Most Azeris seem acutely aware of their country’s economic advantages. When asked for their impressions of economic conditions in their country, 77% of respondents in Azerbaijan said conditions were good. This is the highest percentage among all the CIS states, and it constitutes an unconditional recognition of the economic rise that the country is experiencing. In Armenia, just 27% of the respondents said economic conditions were good.

 

Similarly, Azeris were far more optimistic than is typical in the post-Soviet realm about their country’s economic future. In response to the question “Right now, do you think the economic conditions in this country are getting better or getting worse?” 74% said conditions are improving (only in Kazakhstan, with 73%, is the level of optimism similar). Just 47% of Armenians felt economic conditions in their country were getting better. When asked whether or not they were satisfied with efforts to increase the number and quality of jobs in the country, 31% of the respondents in Azerbaijan answered that they are satisfied; again, this the highest percentage among all the CIS countries. Only 13% responded similarly in Armenia.

But perhaps the question that most clearly reflects the difference between Azeris and Aremenians in terms of hope for the future of their countries has little to do with economics. Respondents in each country were asked, “Do most children in your country have the opportunity to learn and grow, or not?” In Azerbaijan two-thirds (67%) answered “yes” (this percentage is below only Belarus’s 76%), whereas in Armenia just under half, 48%, answered “yes.” It is hard to underestimate the importance in any culture of perceptions regarding the treatment of children.

 

Conclusion

 

It is difficult to find an indicator that does not suggest Azeris are better prepared psychologically to support a war than Armenians. In Azerbaijan, the economic and social situation is better, residents are more likely to identify with their country and less inclined to leave it. They are more likely to have confidence in their government, and more likely to see opportunities for their children within the country.

 

All of this raises the question: are the odds of a potential return to outright war between Armenia and Azerbaijan changing as Azerbaijan’s economic growth translates into growing patriotism and support for the country’s leaders? And if a popular new leader in Azerbaijan decides to capitalize on that support in order to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia, which population is more likely to have the resolve to win?

 

The data presented here clearly suggest the answer to the latter question is Azerbaijan. Growing confidence in their comparative advantage may soon to growing impatience among Azeris to do whatever is necessary to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh and exact revenge for the losses suffered in the early 1990s. As Azeri president Aliyev said in a January 2007 interview with Le Figaro, “Armenians are mistaken in their attempt to gain time, because the ratio of strength is changing to our advantage. Thanks to hydrocarbons our country is growing stronger. Our economy is seven times the size of the Armenian one. Our defense budget this year is equal to the gross national product of Armenia. We cannot conduct negotiations eternally.”